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Abstract 
Safety-critical distributed flight control systems 
require robustness in the presence of faults.  In 
general, these systems consist of a number of 
input/output (I/O) and computation nodes interacting 
through a fault-tolerant data communication system.  
The communication system transfers sensor data and 
control commands and can handle most faults under 
typical operating conditions.  However, the 
performance of the closed-loop system can be 
adversely affected as a result of operating in harsh 
environments.  In particular, High-Intensity Radiated 
Field (HIRF) environments have the potential to 
cause random fault manifestations in individual 
avionic components and to generate simultaneous 
system-wide communication faults that overwhelm 
existing fault management mechanisms.  This paper 
presents the design of an experiment conducted at the 
NASA Langley Research Center's HIRF Laboratory 
to statistically characterize the faults that a HIRF 
environment can trigger on a single node of a 
distributed flight control system. 
Introduction 
Safety-critical distributed closed-loop flight 
control systems require a fault-tolerant 
communication system to reliably transfer sensor 
data and control commands [1].  The performance of 
the control system may be affected if these 
transmissions are altered in the presence of harsh 
environments, such as high energy atmospheric 
neutrons [2],[3] and high intensity radiated fields 
(HIRF) [4],[5].  Aircraft operating in HIRF require 
special certification (see, e.g., [6],[7],[8]).  A fault-
tolerant communication system is used by an aircraft, 
the plant in a flight control system, to reliably send 
the sensor measurements to the controller that 
calculates the commands to be sent back to the plant's 
actuators as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Simplified Schematic of the Plant – 
Distributed Controllers Communication 
The Scalable Processor-Independent Design for 
Enhanced Reliability (SPIDER) architecture is the 
platform used to implement a distributed flight 
control system for this experiment [9].  This 
architecture has been specifically designed to recover 
from faults and is based on formally proven 
protocols.  SPIDER’s current fault-tolerant 
communication system is ROBUS-2, which consists 
of bus interface units (BIUs) that connect the 
processing elements (PEs) to the bus, redundancy 
management units (RMUs) to manage the 
communication traffic and provide robust bus-level 
fault-tolerance, and fiber optic data links [10],[11].  
In this study two types of PEs are considered: Control 
Law PEs, which produce control commands by 
performing control law calculations based on sensor 
data, and I/O PEs, which pass sensor data from the 
plant to the communication system and relay control 
commands to the plant's actuators.  Each PE is 
implemented in a separate physical device, or node, 
with a BIU that provides the PE access to the 
communication bus, creating PE-BIU nodes, whereas 
each RMU is implemented on its own node.  The 
SPIDER distributed flight control system used for 
this study will be referred to as the SPIDER system.  
The SPIDER system configuration is denoted by the 
number of Control Law PE-BIUs   the number of 
RMUs.  For example, the representation for a 
SPIDER system with one I/O PE-BIU, N  Control 
PE-BIUs, and M  RMUs is N M .  For simplicity, 
only one I/O PE-BIU is considered in this study. 
The basic operation of a SPIDER based flight 
control system is as follows.  The control system 
operation begins at the beginning of a control cycle 
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with the I/O PE-BIU acquiring the plant's sensor 
measurements.  The data is then passed from the BIU 
to the RMUs.  From the RMUs, the data is 
transferred to all the BIUs, including the BIUs 
associated with the Control Law PEs.  At these PEs, 
the control commands are computed based on the 
sensor data.  The commands are then sent from the 
BIUs connected to the Control Law PEs back to the 
RMUs and on to the BIU connected to the I/O PE.  
This PE sends the commands to the plant.  This 
sequence of closed-loop events shown in Figure 1 
forms a control cycle that is periodically repeated. 
The inverse of the period is the sampling frequency, 
fs, of the control system.  Each control cycle is 
implemented over a number of ROBUS cycles, which 
consist of a sequence of events needed to manage the 
fault-tolerant communications [10],[11]. 
The following terminology is typical in the fault-
injection field.  A fault is a defect or flaw that occurs 
in a hardware or software component.  An error is a 
manifestation of a fault when it causes a component 
to deviate from correctness [12],[13].  In a fault-
tolerant system, many faults will not become errors.  
When the errors cause a system to not function 
properly and not satisfactorily complete the service 
required, this is called a failure [13]. 
The goal of this paper is to present the design of 
an experiment that exposes one Control Law PE to 
HIRF while the designed SPIDER system is 
simulating the operation of a closed-loop flight 
control system.  The purpose of the experiment is to 
gather data on the occurrence of errors on the 
exposed node, to develop statistical models for them, 
and to use these models to predict the closed-loop 
system performance degradation.  The experiment 
was recently conducted at the NASA Langley 
Research Center's HIRF Laboratory.  For this 
experiment, an error monitoring system had to be 
designed, implemented, and validated. A 
comprehensive treatment is presented in [14],[15].  
The experimental HIRF-induced error data will be 
used to estimate their effect on the tracking error of a 
Boeing 747 closed-loop digital flight control system.  
This tracking error will then be compared with 
estimates that use the statistical models 
characterizing the occurrence of these errors together 
with a performance model used for tracking error 
prediction [16].  This paper reports on the experiment 
design and presents some initial data analysis.  The 
physical platform of the SPIDER nodes used in the 
experiment is not flight certified.  Each physical node 
contains a CPU module for the software, a Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) module, where 
Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) 
Hardware Description Language (VHDL) is 
synthesized on the FPGA, a power supply, a fan 
module, and two boards for the eight optical I/O 
communication ports [14].  The CPU module runs 
White Dwarf LINUX and has a keyboard input and a 
monitor display.  All of the components of a physical 
node are encapsulated within an enclosure.  However, 
the enclosure was removed to increase susceptibility 
of the node to HIRF-induced errors. 
The experiment was conducted in the 
reverberation Chamber A [17].  The dimensions of 
this chamber are 2.90 7.01 14.33m m m   (height   
width   depth).  Inside the chamber are placed a 
transmit antenna, receive antenna, two stirrers near 
opposite corners, and two cameras. In addition, the 
node under test is placed on a non-conductive foam 
block. Following RTCA/DO-160F Section 20 
standards [8], the objects inside the chamber are 
appropriately separated from each other and from the 
walls.  For this experiment, the transmit antenna 
radiates continuous waves of a given frequency and 
field strength.  The receive antenna is connected to a 
measurement system that includes a spectrum 
analyzer.  The transmit antenna and continuously 
rotating stirrers create a time-varying electromagnetic 
field environment that can induce electrical current, 
and thereby inject faults into the node under test. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The next section presents the HIRF experiment 
design and implementation. This section has six 
subsections. The first one gives the design 
specifications and assumptions, including a high-
level overview of the design and a description of the 
management systems that coordinate the execution of 
the experiment.  Next is a subsection introducing the 
Function Monitors (FMons), which are used to detect 
the occurrence of errors in the node under test.  The 
next two subsections present the selection of the 
parameters for the electromagnetic environment and 
the experimental configuration.  The techniques 
implemented to prevent permanent damage to the 
power supply are presented in the following one.  
The final subsection gives a summary of the 
procedure to select the parameters of an experimental 
round.  The next section gives the experimental 
results. It is divided into three subsections: summary 
of rounds completed, Function Monitor observations, 
and data analysis.  The paper’s conclusions are given 
in the final section. 
Design of the HIRF Experiment 
Design Specifications and Assumptions 
The ultimate goal of this work is to predict the 
performance degradation of an aircraft that uses a 
flight control system based on the SPIDER system 
currently available.  HIRF exposure can cause both 
transient and permanent faults in electronic systems 
[18].  However, to prevent damage to the node 
subjected to HIRF, the first experiment specification 
is to focus on transient faults.  This specification will 
be met by limiting the maximum amplitudes of the 
electrical field strengths that are selected for the 
experiment.  The second specification is for the 
interface between the SPIDER system and the 
experiment management system.  The interface 
should not affect the ROBUS-2 fault tolerant 
communication system.  The third specification is for 
the experiment to monitor the occurrence of errors in 
real-time.  It is assumed that detected errors in the 
node under test during the experiment translate to 
fail-silent type error behavior in the post-test 
analysis.  The fail-silent assumption means that the 
node under test either works properly or does not 
produce any output when an error is manifested 
[12],[19].  Fail-silent behavior can be achieved at a 
reasonable cost [12], but in the experiment it will not 
be enforced.  The assumption, nevertheless, will 
simplify the analysis of the effect of the errors. A 
design for these specifications is presented next. 
At a high level, the HIRF experiment consists of 
an N M  SPIDER system, a SPIDER management 
system, and a HIRF management system.  The 
SPIDER management system is partitioned into an 
experimental execution subsystem and a data 
management subsystem.  The experimental execution 
subsystem is implemented in a test controller, a node 
that is not part of the SPIDER system but physically 
equivalent.  The test controller is interfaced to each 
PE-BIU and RMU node using links that are not part 
of ROBUS. Physically, each node has eight 
independent transmit and receive channels. For the 
purposes of this experiment, some of these links were 
used for ROBUS communication and some to 
communicate with the test controller.  Since each 
node has only eight communication ports, the 
maximum possible connections from a single test 
controller to the PE-BIUs and RMUs is eight.  To 
prepare for future tests containing more than eight 
SPIDER system nodes in the configuration, it was 
necessary to split the test controller into two nodes 
interfaced to the PE-BIU and RMU nodes named the 
Primary Test Controller (PTC) and Secondary Test 
Controller (STC), respectively.   
To monitor the occurrence of errors in the 
Control Law PE exposed to HIRF, an 
N M SPIDER system was configured to operate in 
a simulated closed-loop system as depicted in 
Figure 2.  The STC is not depicted here because it 
does not provide observations about the errors 
monitored.  To close the loop, simulated sensor 
signals are generated in the PTC and transmitted to 
the I/O PE, which broadcasts the data via its BIU to 
all the PE’s in the SPIDER system.  To verify that 
each PE correctly received the sensor data, the PEs 
send it back to the PTC.  To simplify the 
implementation, the Control Law PEs do not perform 
any calculations, but receive simulated computed 
control commands from the PTC.  The Control Law 
PEs then broadcast the commands via their BIUs to 
all the PEs, and the PEs complete the loop by sending 
the commands back to the PTC.  At the PTC, 
comparisons are made to diagnose if there was an 
error in the transmission of sensor and/or command 
data during each control cycle.  
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Figure 2. Schematic of the Data Paths for Error 
Monitoring 
An experimental round is the sequence of 
actions performed by the SPIDER management 
system shown in Figure 4.  The events of a round 
include the operator enable at each test controller, the 
setting of the radiation parameters, the execution of a 
selected number of control cycles, and the transfer of 
the observation data and test logs to the repository 
[14].   
The ROBUS cycle events shown in Figure E 
are: clock synchronization, diagnosis of SPIDER 
nodes, schedule update, and PE Broadcast 
[14].  During the PE broadcast block of a ROBUS 
cycle, each PE has time allocated to broadcast its 
messages.  The ROBUS communication schedule is 
such that the PEs only broadcast once per control 
cycle.   When the node under test contains a 
transient fault, the node may be isolated from the rest 
of the SPIDER system during the diagnosis phase of 
a ROBUS cycle.  Once the fault has lifted, the 
reintegration of the node under test into the SPIDER 
system can take up to about 7.37 ROBUS 
cycles.  Assuming the fault does not last more than 
one ROBUS cycle, at least 9 ROBUS cycles are 
required per control cycle to guarantee that the fault 
only affects one control cycle.  For this experiment, 
the control cycle duration was 10 ROBUS cycles.  
The first ROBUS cycle was chosen to have all PEs 
broadcast their data.  During the remaining nine 
cycles, no PEs are scheduled to transmit.  To 
determine the duration of a control cycle, its inverse, 
i.e., the sampling period fs is calculated as follows.  
For this experiment, the ROBUS clock runs at 3 MHz 
and each ROBUS cycle is set to last about 1715 clock 
cycles.  Thus,  
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Figure 3. ROBUS Cycle (1/(10fs) sec) 
To validate the operation of the SPIDER 
management system, the capability to inject software-
induced faults was also designed and implemented. 
Figure 4 depicts a top-level view of the SPIDER 
management system interfaced with a SPIDER 
system, including the modules needed for software-
induced fault-injection.  The Test Execution Software 
and the Data Management Software have a user 
interface including a display monitor and a keyboard 
input.  The execution of each set of rounds starts by 
reading a Test Specification File in the Data 
Management Personal Computer (PC) which 
provides the test controllers with runtime parameters 
specific to that test.  The Test Specification File is 
given only to the PTC, which then transfers to the 
STC the necessary information.  The Controller 
Coordination Links (CCLs) are fiber optic data links 
between the PTC and STC.  The Test Execution 
Software of both test controllers handles the 
specifications from the file and communicates with 
the Data Management PC to store the observations 
and test logs at the end of a round.  The PTC and 
STC use Primary Test Links (PTLs) and Secondary 
Test Links (STLs), respectively, to communicate 
with the corresponding nodes.  Each controller has a 
software interface unit to manage the communication 
between the software and hardware.   
A brief description of a test controllers’ protocol 
follows.  At the beginning of the round, the operator 
enables the round at each test controller specifying 
the radiation settings for the round.  The CPUs in the 
PTC and STC specify the beginning of the round by 
sending a signal to the software interface in the 
FPGA during the System Enable mode.  The Round 
Controller starts the Round Timer (RTmr) and 
enables the round.  Once the System Health Monitors 
determine that SPIDER is ready, the Round 
Controllers exchange Ready messages across the 
CCL and signal to the software that SPIDER is ready.  
The SPIDER management system then enters the 
Fault Injection Setup mode, where the PTC software 
sends the fault-injection specifications, if any, to the 
PTC Fault Injection Cotnroller (FIC).  The PTC FIC 
forwards the received data across the CCL to the STC 
FIC.  The fault-injection specifications are sent to the 
fault injectors within the PE-BIUs and RMUs via the 
PTLs and STLs, respectively.  Once the FICs have all 
the fault injection data, the STC is ready to start 
executing the round and sends a Start message across 
the CCL.  Then the SPIDER management system 
enters the Function Setup mode, where the PTC 
software sends application assignments (I/O or 
Control Law) for the PEs and the duration of a 
control cycle and round to the Function Monitors at 
the PTC. 
After this setup is complete, the Round 
Controller at the PTC then sends a Start message 
across the CCL to the STC, thus beginning the 
Function Execution mode.  The Round Controller 
enables the PTC FMons and Function Timer (FTmr) 
as well as the PTC and STC FICs and System Health 
Monitors.  The control cycles begin executing, and 
the State Monitors (SMons), FMons, FTmr, and 
RTmr generate records to send back to the software.  
In this experiment, only the FMon records were read 
by the PTC’s software.  FMon results are used to 
diagnose if a SPIDER error occurred and provide 
some insight into the possible causes.  The FMons 
receive data about where errors occurred in the 
system and provide additional checks to check if the 
correct data was transmitted through the entire 
communication system successfully. 
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Figure 4. SPIDER Management System 
The PTC software informs the Round Controller 
that the round is complete once FMon observations 
have been gathered for the preset number of control 
cycles.  Then the Round Controller stops execution at 
the PTC and sends a Stop message across the CCL to 
the STC Round Controller that then stops the 
execution at the STC.  Both Round Controllers report 
the stop trigger condition to the software.  The PTC 
and STC Test Execution Software send this stop 
condition to the Data Management Software to be 
stored in the repository.  The FMon observation 
records stored in the PTC Test Execution Software 
are then transferred to the Data Management 
Software, which stores the data in the repository, and 
a round of execution is complete.  The next 
subsection describes how these FMon observations 
are formed. 
Function Monitors 
The main purpose of the Function Monitors in 
the PTC is to determine the occurrence of errors in 
the SPIDER system. Associated with each PE, there 
is a function monitor transmitter and a function 
monitor receiver. During the PEs’ scheduled time 
period, the function monitor transmitters send sensor 
and command data to the I/O PE and the Control Law 
PEs, respectively.  Each PE’s BIU then transfers the 
data through the RMUs to all of the BIUs, including 
the transmitting BIU shown in Figure 5.  From the 
BIUs, the data is transferred to their associated PEs 
and FMon receivers.  Because of the broadcast nature 
of ROBUS-2, all of the FMon receivers make 
observations on each sensor or command data 
transmission.  For example, in a 2 1  system, when 
the FMon associated with PE-BIU 1 transmits, the 
FMons associated with all the PEs make an 
observation about the transmission through ROBUS-
2.  To simplify the notation, the FMon associated 
with PE-BIU i is denoted FMon i.  Each observation 
made at FMon i about the transmission originating 
from FMon j is a value from 0 to 7.  The definitions 
of these observations are given in Table 1.  For 
further details on the operation of the FMons see 
[14]. 
The observations for each control cycle can be 
represented with a square matrix of FMon 
observations with row and column dimensions equal 
to the number of PEs as shown in Table 2.  PEs are 
considered transmitting (Tx) when they broadcast 
their sensor or command data to ROBUS-2 and 
receiving (Rx) when they obtain data from ROBUS-
2.  Each row gives the observation codes determined 
by a function monitor receiver with respect to a 
function monitor transmitter on each column.  The 
observation code 7 in the ,i j th entry of the matrix 
means that the data that was sent by the j th PE was 
received without errors by the i th PE.  If there are 
any observations other than 7 in the matrix of FMon 
observations for a given control cycle, then the node 
in the HIRF Chamber is said to be operating in the 
error mode for that control cycle. 
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Figure 5. FMon Control Data Transmission Path 
Table 1. Definitions of FMon i Observation Codes 
Code Observation Definition 
0 
Omitted 
Sender Id 
FMon i received no 
message from FMon j 
1 
Invalid 
Sender Id 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j when PE j is 
not active 
2 
Repeated 
Sender Id 
FMon i received multiple 
messages from FMon j 
3 
Bad Payload 
Length 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j with an 
incorrect message length 
4 
Detected 
Reception 
Error at 
Receiver PE 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j where PE i 
detected a reception error 
on ROBUS 
5 
Detected 
Reception 
Error at 
Sender PE 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j where PE j 
detected a reception error 
on PTL 
6 
Bad Message 
Content 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j with incorrect 
content (undetected error) 
7 
Good 
Message 
FMon i received a message 
from FMon j with the 
correct content 
Table 2. Possible FMon Observations 
 FMon Tx 0 FMon Tx 1 FMon Tx 2 
FMon Rx 0 0-7 0-7 0-7 
FMon Rx 1 0-7 0-7 0-7 
FMon Rx 2 0-7 0-7 0-7 
 
HIRF Specifications 
The experiment exposed a single SPIDER node 
to HIRF inside a reverberation chamber.  It has been 
shown that the electromagnetic environment in the 
aircraft cavity is similar to that of a mode-stirred 
chamber [20],[21].  To select the electromagnetic 
environment parameters, standards for radiated 
susceptibility tests were followed [8],[7].  For 
airworthiness certification of electronic equipment, 
the FAA requires immunity to RF environments at 
various field strengths between 10 KHz and 40 GHz 
[7].  RTCA/DO-160 procedures for HIRF testing of 
airborne equipment cover a frequency range of 100 
MHz to 18 GHz [8].  To narrow down the choice of 
frequencies and to follow the experiment 
specification of avoiding permanent errors, only 
frequencies between 100 MHz to 200 MHz were 
considered.  Supporting this choice are the fly-by test 
results described in [22].  They report 
electromagnetic coupling effects inside the cabin of 
NASA’s Boeing 757 when flying near “a fixed 
transmitter driving a log periodic array (172 MHz).”  
Thus, the HIRF environment generated was a 
continuous wave at one of the chosen frequencies 
between 100 MHz and 200MHz with the stirrers 
continuously rotating (for mode-stirring).  To select 
the frequencies a procedure similar to that in [8] was 
followed.  Twenty-five logarithmically spaced 
frequencies were selected in the decade starting at 
100 MHz.  The first eight frequencies are under the 
chosen limit of 200 MHz.  The selected frequencies 
are: 100, 110.07, 121.15, 133.35, 146.78, 161.56, 
177.83, and 195.73 MHz.  This frequency selection 
was also used in a previous HIRF experiment with a 
SPIDER system [17].  For each frequency, the range 
of field strengths selected for this experiment was up 
to 300 V/m. 
There were two main sources of randomness in 
the experiment.  First, the electromagnetic 
environment is random: the mathematical models for 
the average and peak electrical fields in the chamber 
are given in terms of probability distributions [20].  
Second, at the beginning of each round the phase 
difference between the stirrers is random. Thus, the 
data for this experiment will be a random sequence of 
observations for each trial, i.e., each round.  Invoking 
the fail-silent assumption makes it possible to reduce 
the possible values of this sequence at each control 
cycle to only two values: 0 and 1, denoting no error 
and error detected, respectively.  These sequences are 
samples of a random process that is denoted by z1(k), 
where the integer k denotes the control cycle number.  
The round duration was selected so that it would be 
possible to repeat the trial a sufficient number of 
times for statistical analysis.  The choice was 20,800 
control cycles per round or about 2 minutes.  A few 
rounds with 939,600 control cycles or about 90 
minutes were also executed. 
The final HIRF Chamber specification that 
needs to be determined is the rotation speed of the 
two stirrers.  For mode stirring chamber operation, 
the stirrers are continuously rotating.  Each stirrer is 
independently positioned by a stepper motor with 
507,904 steps.  By rotating them at different speeds, 
the effective period when both stirrers return to the 
same position can be selected.  For the 2-minute 
rounds, the stirrers are configured to rotate at 7 and 
18 seconds per revolution, providing an effective 
period of 2.1 minutes.  For the 90-minute rounds, the 
stirrers rotate at 8 and 8.01 seconds per revolution, 
providing an effective period of about 106.8 minutes.  
NIST Technical Note 1508 [20] describes how the 
electromagnetic environment at any particular 
location in a reverberation chamber is defined by the 
electromagnetic boundary conditions set by all 
paddle positions.   Thus, for mode stirring, the 
chamber boundary conditions repeat in a periodic 
fashion as the paddle rotations repeat.   NIST TN 
1508 also provides data for NASA’s Chamber A 
configuration using two independent paddles, and 
describes how the paddles may be rotated at different 
rates to increase the effective period of repeating 
electromagnetic environment, i.e., total number of 
effective paddle positions.  This is the reason that the 
effective period of the pair of stirrers was selected to 
be slightly more than the round duration. This 
difference adds another source of randomness: each 
round is exposed to a different electromagnetic 
environment for a few seconds. The statistical effect 
of this difference is expected to be reduced when a 
round is repeated at the same frequency and field 
strength. 
Experiment Configuration 
A 2 1  SPIDER system configuration was 
chosen for the HIRF experiment with an I/O PE, a 
control law PE, and an RMU outside of the HIRF 
chamber, and only one control law PE subject to 
HIRF induced errors inside the chamber as shown in 
Figure 6.  The smallest SPIDER system configuration 
is 1 1  with an I/O PE-BIU, a Control Law PE-BIU, 
and an RMU.  The additional Control Law PE 
located outside of the chamber was included in the 
system to neutralize the effects of possible fail-silent 
assumption violations.   The node in the chamber is 
connected to the RMU and PTC with fiber-optic 
cables which are known not to be affected by HIRF 
[12].  Also, the two test controllers are connected to a 
Data Management PC via Ethernet.  For this physical 
fault-injection experiment, a HIRF Test Controller 
(HTC) is used to control the HIRF chamber 
instrumentation and maintain coordination with the 
PTC and STC nodes.  The HTC runs in another PC.  
It was implemented with Agilent Visual Engineering 
Environment (VEE) software by the HIRF personnel 
[23].  The HTC communicates with the PTC and 
STC using two independent RS-232 serial lines to 
coordinate the events of a round of execution.  It is 
necessary for the HTC to control the radiation and 
activity within the HIRF chamber to meet DO-160F 
standards [8]. 
Power Supply Failure Detection 
A problem of exposing these physical nodes to 
HIRF is permanent damage to the node’s power 
supply [17].   In [17] brownouts in a power supply 
were found to be precursors to power supply failure.  
A brownout occurs when one or more boards in the 
node subjected to radiation experience a voltage drop 
[24],[25].  Thus, the fault-monitoring system needs to 
prevent brownouts as much as possible, have a good 
brownout detection mechanism and have a clear 
protocol for what to do if one occurs.  During a 
power supply brownout, the node does not receive 
enough power to function, indicating a power supply 
failure.  The node detects this internally by means of 
a voltage-sensing reset circuit on the CPU board, 
which causes the node to remain in reset until the 
voltage returns to the normal level for operation.  
When the node is in reset or initializing after a reset, 
it does not produce any outputs, i.e., behaves fail-
silently, for a significant number of control cycles in 
a row.  The first detection mechanism is to identify 
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Figure 6. SPIDER System HIRF Experiment Configuration 
when several control cycles of no output are seen in 
the FMon results.  Over time, exposure to high field 
strengths can cause the current drawn by the power 
supply to start increasing.  A second detection 
mechanism is to monitor for current trending up in 
the power supply.  If either mechanism detects an 
impending power supply failure, the radiation is 
automatically turned off and the round would end to 
avoid damaging the node. 
Procedure for Selecting Round Settings 
The HIRF experiment consists of rounds where 
two main radiation parameters are varied: frequency 
( f ) and field strength (|E|).  Since the occurrence of 
errors (z1(k) = 1 for a control cycle k) is frequency 
dependent, the field strength was gradually increased 
in 10 V/m steps until the percentage of control cycles 
having an error in a round was over 5%.  This 
percentage is the sample time average of z1(k), i.e., 
the sample error mean given by 
 
1 , 1
1
1
ˆ ( )
k
z k
i
z i
k


  . 
When k equals the round’s last control cycle, the 
sample error mean is denoted by 
1
ˆ
z . A near real-
time running estimate of 
1 ,
ˆ
z k  was shown in a 
computer display monitored by the operator.  This 
made it possible for the operator to manually stop the 
round if the estimate of 
1 ,
ˆ
z k  got to be too large.   
There were two different types of rounds 
executed during the HIRF experiment: sweeps and 
Monte Carlo runs.  A sweep consists of a set of 2-
minute rounds for each of the eight frequencies and a 
range of field strengths in 10 V/m increments.  Ten 
sweeps were completed at each frequency.  The first 
round of a sweep starts with a field strength of 10 
V/m and each subsequent round is 10 V/m higher 
than the previous one until 
1
ˆ 0.05z  .  All future 
sweeps start a few 10 V/m increments below the first 
field strength that showed at least one error.  The 
highest field strength of the sweeps for one frequency 
is the same as for first sweep unless a brownout is 
detected.  If there is a brownout, the rest of the 
sweeps are truncated at a lower field strength.  A set 
of Monte Carlo runs consists of repeated trials with 
the same duration and a constant frequency and field 
strength.  These sets were created for both the 2-
minute and 90-minute durations. 
Results of the HIRF Experiment 
Rounds Completed 
A total of 1813 rounds were executed during the 
HIRF experiment.  Sweeps were conducted at each of 
the eight chosen frequencies.  All the sweeps were 2 
minutes long. They started at the lowest field strength 
of 10 V/m and increased in 10 V/m increments as 
planned until the operators deemed it unsafe to 
continue.  The sweeps for 100 MHz, 121.15 MHz, 
and 133.35 MHz went up to 200 V/m, 140 V/m, and 
210 V/m, respectively.  After the first run of a sweep, 
the subsequent runs started about two levels lower 
than when the first errors were detected.  The 
executed rounds for the other five frequencies 
resulted in 
1
ˆ
z  much less than 0.05 up to 250 V/m.  
For these frequencies, there were not a significant 
number of errors for the tested field strengths. 
For the three frequencies where errors were 
observed in the sweeps, the maximum and mid-range 
field strengths were chosen to run at least 150 2-
minute rounds as shown in Table 3.  Then using the 
same stirrer rates that give an effective period of 
about 2.1 minutes, four 90-minute rounds for each 
frequency with the maximum field strength were 
completed.  A single 90-minute round for each of the 
three frequencies at their respective maximum field 
strengths was run with the stirrer rates that give an 
effective period of 106.8 minutes.  These are shown 
in Table 4. 
After the Monte Carlo runs, extended sweeps 
were executed using higher field strengths as long as 
1
ˆ 0.18z   or the field strength reached 270 V/m. 
 
Table 3. Monte Carlo Runs at Stirrer Rates of 7 
and 18 sec / rev 
f 
(MHz) 
|E|  
(V/m) 
Duration 
(min) 
Total 
Rounds 
100 200 2 151 
121.15 140 2 150 
133.35 210 2 150 
100 180 2 150 
121.15 120 2 163 
133.35 190 2 150 
100 200 90 4 
121.15 140 90 4 
133.35 210 90 4 
 
Table 4. Single 90-Minute Runs at Stirrer Rates of 
8 and 8.01 sec / rev 
f 
(MHz) 
|E| 
 (V/m) 
100 200 
121.15 140 
133.35 210 
Function Monitor Observations 
Since PE-BIU 0 and 2 are not subjected to 
radiated fields (see Figure 6), it is assumed that they 
never experience faults.  Because of this assumption, 
each function monitor observation in the matrix in 
Table 2 that does not include PE-BIU 1 in the 
transmission path should always be 7.  Thus, the four 
corners of the matrix, which correspond to the 
observations involving only PE-BIU 0 and 2 should 
be 7 for each control cycle.  If, at any time during the 
HIRF experiment, these observations are not equal to 
7 then that is a clear indication that the fault-injection 
and monitoring system is not functioning properly.  
Throughout the experiment, these observations were 
always 7. 
During the Monte Carlo runs of the HIRF 
experiment, the function monitor observations only 
reported three different error type matrices for the 
control cycles.  Error Type 0 is the case where 
everything worked properly and the data that was 
sent was received for that control cycle.  The other 
two error types are given in Table 5 and Table 6 as 
Error Type 1 and Error Type 2, respectively.  The 
observations for each round can be represented by the 
random process  k  taking values in  0,1,2 . By 
combining or lumping the last two error types into a 
single type, the previously defined random process 
 1z k  follows. 
Table 5. Observations for Error Type 1 
 FMon Tx 0 FMon Tx 1 FMon Tx 2 
FMon Rx 0 7 4 7 
FMon Rx 1 0 0 0 
FMon Rx 2 7 4 7 
 
Table 6. Observations for Error Type 2 
 FMon Tx 0 FMon Tx 1 FMon Tx 2 
FMon Rx 0 7 5 7 
FMon Rx 1 7 5 7 
FMon Rx 2 7 5 7 
 
The HIRF experiment design allows for a partial 
characterization of the causes of Error Types 1 and 2 
during a control cycle.  The main assumption is that 
only the node located in the HIRF chamber can 
experience errors.  The goal of this fault analysis is 
not to perform fault isolation, i.e., pinpoint exactly 
where within the node the faults occurred.  This is not 
needed because of the fail-silent assumption that as 
long as the fault is detected, it will not produce 
outputs in the closed-loop system analysis.  The node 
under test has two types of communication links: 
PTLs to the PTC and ROBUS links (RLs) to the 
RMU.  Each of these types of links is a pair of 
transmit and receive links. Since the function 
monitors report observations (comparisons of sent 
and received data) through both types of links, only 
errors manifested in at least one of the four links of 
the node in the chamber can result in an error 
observation other than 7.  From a previous 
experiment where the physical nodes were placed in 
a HIRF environment [17], most errors were found to 
be caused by communication link faults. 
One possible cause for Error Type 1 is located in 
the link from the function monitor transmitter to the 
node receiver.  At the beginning of the control cycle, 
the node in the chamber is supposed to receive a 
synchronization message (see [14]) and a function 
monitor set of command data through its link to the 
PTC.   In order for a PE-BIU node to remain in 
normal operation, it must receive the synchronization 
message within a pre-specified interval during a 
ROBUS cycle.  If there is an error with this message 
detected at the receiver, then the PE-BIU node 
declares a failure, triggers a reset, and goes to an 
initialization mode [14].  The node may remain in 
this mode for multiple control cycles depending on 
the duration of the fault.  During these control cycles, 
the function monitor observations will be as in 
Table 5 for Error Type 1.  The FMon message is a 
data message that is not critical to the operation of 
the SPIDER system unlike the synchronization 
message, which is why they cause different errors in 
the same link. 
The link from the function monitor transmitter to 
the node receiver can also cause Error Type 2.  When 
an error in the function monitor data is detected by 
the node in the chamber, it asserts an error flag in the 
header of the data message, and broadcasts it through 
the RMU according to the schedule.  The RMU then 
transmits this message to all of the PE-BIUs, where it 
is then forwarded to their associated function 
monitors in the PTC.  This error flag is then 
translated into a 5 in the observations and is located 
in the column for the PE-BIU in the chamber 
transmitting as shown in Table 6 for Error Type 2. 
The communication link from the node in the 
chamber to the PTC is used to send a data message 
during a control cycle.  If the receiver at the function 
monitor detects a format or CRC packet error, then it 
rejects the entire message thus reporting a 0 
observation.  In this case, all other FMon 
observations should be 7.  Since this FMon matrix 
did not occur during the HIRF Experiment Monte 
Carlo runs, it is highly unlikely that an error on this 
link occurred. 
The third communication link connects the 
transmitter of the RMU to the receiver of the PE-BIU 
in the HIRF chamber via a RL.  If an error is detected 
at the PE-BIU receiver of this link, then the BIU 
diagnoses the RMU as being faulty.  Since this 
experiment only has a single RMU and the BIU in 
the chamber does not trust this RMU, this essentially 
means the PE-BIU node is disconnected from the 
bus.  Since the PE-BIU is not able to communicate on 
the bus, it declares a failure.  Similar to when the PE-
BIU detected an error with the synchronization 
message from the PTC, the failure triggers a reset and 
the node returns to initialization mode where the 
FMon observations are recorded as in Table 5. 
The final communication link involving the 
node under test connects the PE-BIU RL transmitter 
to the RMU receiver.  If an error is found on a 
message from the PE-BIU in the chamber, the RMU 
diagnoses that node as bad.  If the diagnosis remains 
when ROBUS executes the global diagnostic 
protocol at the end of the diagnostic cycle [14], the 
PE-BIU subject to HIRF is removed from the system 
and goes into reset. This is another failure condition 
within the PE-BIU node that triggers a node reset and 
results in the observations of Table 5.  Also, 
whenever the PE is scheduled to transmit and the 
RMU has diagnosed it as faulty, the RMU replaces 
the message from the PE with a SOURCE_ERROR 
message and broadcasts it to all of the PE-BIUs [14].  
The BIU of the node in the chamber recognizes that 
the message received is not the same as the message 
that was sent, which means that either the PE-BIU 
node is faulty or the single RMU node is faulty.  For 
both of these cases, the PE-BIU goes into recovery 
and the PE stops sending messages to its function 
monitor, which results in Table 5 as well.  As long as 
the node remains in the initialization phase, the FMon 
will not receive updates from the PE, so the Error 
Type 1 remains. 
Given that only the node in the chamber is 
subject to faults and only the data at the interfaces of 
the node are affected, all faults are shown with at 
least one FMon observation other than 7 for the 
control cycle.  This means that all faults in the system 
will show up in the FMon observations.  Fault-Tree 
Analysis is used to depict the causes of the error 
types found during the experiment [26],[27] as shown 
in Figure 7.  There is no way to distinguish which 
communication link caused Error Type 1 using only 
FMon observations.  Error Type 2 observed in the 
HIRF Experiment only had one root cause satisfying 
our assumptions as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. FMon Observations for Error Type 1  
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Figure 8. FMon Observations for Error Type 2 
Data Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of the 2-minute random 
sequences  k  and  1z k for the three sets of 
sweeps and six sets of Monte Carlo runs shown in 
Table 3 are presented in this section.  For each 
control cycle k,  k and  1z k  are discrete random 
variables.  Their probability distributions can be 
estimated via ensemble averages.  To analyze the 
sweeps, where only ten rounds at each frequency and 
field strength were recorded, ensemble averages 
would be poorly estimated.  On the other hand, 
sample time averages give better estimates, since 
each 2-minute round has 20,880 samples.  When the 
ensemble averages of each random variable are 
constant and finite,  the sample time averages can be 
used to estimate the ensemble mean, if the random 
processes  k and  1z k  are ergodic in the mean 
[28]. Under these assumptions, the sample time 
averages of z1(k) were analyzed.  Since this process at 
each time instant is either 0 or 1, the sample time 
averages are in fact estimating the probability that an 
error occurred during a control cycle,   1 1P z k  .  
The error probabilities for each round of the sweeps 
were calculated, resulting in ten estimates for each 
frequency and field strength.  The average and 
standard deviation of these estimates are shown as 
error bars in Figure 9.  As expected, the higher field 
strengths produced higher error probabilities.  This 
error probability is frequency dependent with much 
higher errors resulting at 121.15 MHz than for 100 
and 133.35 MHz.  The figure shows an artifact due to 
the way the experiment was conducted.  In each case, 
the extended sweeps exposed the node to a different 
electromagnetic environment since the phase 
difference of the stirrers was changed when they 
were made to rotate with an effective period of 106.8 
minutes during the Monte Carlo runs in Table 4, 
which were executed before the extended sweeps.  
This change resulted in lower error probabilities 
during the extended sweeps.  If the extended sweeps 
are not taken into account, the average probabilities 
for each sweep are well approximated by a quadratic 
or cubic polynomial.  Cubic polynomial fits of the 
sweeps and their predicted values for higher field 
strengths are also shown in Figure 9.  The error 
probabilities of the sweep at 121.15 MHz start about 
15 and 635 times higher than the error probabilities 
of the sweeps at 100 MHz and 133.35 MHz, 
respectively.  The cubic fit extrapolations predict that 
at 121.15 MHz, the error probability will reach 1 at 
267 V/m.  At this field strength, the error probability 
of the sweep at 121.15 MHz is about 7 and 5.6 times 
higher than the error probabilities of the sweeps at 
100 MHz and 133.35 MHz, respectively.  The error 
probabilities of the sweeps at 100 MHz and 133.35 
MHz are about the same below 180 V/m.  As the 
field strength increases, the approximations predict 
that the error probabilities at 133.35 MHz will be 
about 1.2 times those at 100 MHz.  It is surprising 
that the error probability predictions of the fits at 100 
MHz match well the extended sweep measurements 
at 133.35 MHz.  Figure 9 also shows the error 
probabilities between 80 V/m to 290 V/m estimated 
using another sweep at 100 MHz.  It is denoted as 
Sweep 0, since the position of the node and its cables 
is slightly different than in the rest of the HIRF 
experiment. Nevertheless, the error probabilities of 
this sweep are similar to the other estimates up to 200 
MHz, and they are also consistent with the 
predictions up to 290 V/m except for the error 
probability estimates at 270 V/m and 280 V/m. 
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Figure 9. Estimates of Error Probabilities for each Sweep 
To analyze the sets of Monte Carlo runs, it is 
possible to approximate the probabilities of each 
error type by averaging over the ensemble.  The 
arithmetic average of the ensemble probability 
estimates for  k , denoted by  ˆ{ }P k i  , i=0,1,2, 
is given in Table 7. Note that  
    1 0ˆ ˆ{ } }0{P z Pk k   
 and  
      1ˆ ˆ1 1 2ˆ{ } { } { }P z P k kPk    . 
The averages of these probabilities are given in 
Table 7. A visualization of the error probabilities, 
 1 1ˆ{ }P z k  , is given in Figure 10.  The box plots of 
each Monte Carlo set denote the medians with a red 
line, and the top and bottom of the boxes correspond 
to the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, respectively.  The data 
outside of the whiskers is considered an outlier. Only 
the 100 MHz at 200 V/m had outliers.  The boxplot 
also shows that the data is skewed, since the median 
is not near the center. These error probability 
estimates were then compared to the sample time 
averages of the Monte Carlo runs.  For each error 
type the sample time average probability estimate is 
almost the same as the ensemble average.  This result 
reassured us to make the sample time average 
analysis of the sweeps. 
Table 7. Error Type Probabilities for 2-Minute 
Monte Carlo Runs 
f 
(MHz) 
|E| 
(V/m) 
 ˆ{ }0P k 
 
 ˆ{ }1P k 
 
 ˆ{ }2P k 
 
100 180 0.9848 0.0119 0.0033 
100 200 0.9663 0.0286 0.0051 
121.15 120 0.9819 0.0140 0.0040 
121.15 140 0.9355 0.0570 0.0075 
133.35 190 0.9840 0.0130 0.0031 
133.35 210 0.9454 0.0479 0.0067 
 
 
Figure 10.  1 1ˆ{ }P z k   for 2-Minute Monte Carlo 
Runs 
Conclusion 
A  HIRF fault-injection experiment was 
designed, implemented, and conducted at the NASA 
Langley Research Center's HIRF Laboratory.  The 
experiment consisted of a  2 1  SPIDER system 
running in simulated closed-loop with a test 
controller that provided sensor and control 
commands as well as monitored for incorrect 
transmissions in the SPIDER system.  For this 
experiment one of the SPIDER nodes simulating a 
Control Law computational node was subjected to 
radiation in a HIRF chamber while the rest of the 
2 1  system was not exposed to HIRF and assumed 
not to fail during the experiment.  HIRF parameter 
settings were selected to inject faults in the system 
without causing permanent damage to the node.  Out 
of the eight selected frequencies, three triggered 
errors in the node for field strengths that did not lead 
to permanent errors. 
Results from two main types of experimental 
rounds, sweeps and Monte Carlo runs, were 
presented.  The time averages were used to estimate 
the probability of errors during the sweeps.  It was 
shown that these errors can be fitted with a 
polynomial, which could be used to predict the error 
probability at higher field intensities. A preliminary 
statistical analysis of the Monte Carlo data collected 
during the physical HIRF fault-injection experiment 
was also presented.  The data showed that time 
averages can be used to estimate the ensemble 
averages.  During all the Monte Carlo runs, most of 
the control cycles passed with no errors and only two 
types of errors were detected.  These errors could 
have been caused by a number of different types of 
faults in the communication links of the node in the 
chamber.  A more comprehensive analysis of the data 
and their effect in a flight control system will appear 
in future publications. 
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